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Looking Ahead: October Term 2016
Glenn Harlan Reynolds*

At the end of the Supreme Court’s term in June 2015, the Court
had granted 82 petitions for certiorari. At the end of the term in 2016,
the number was 29. And, of those granted, the cases were mostly
relatively technical and unimportant, at least compared to the
high profile cases of 2016. So, “few and boring” is the in-a-nutshell
description of the Supreme Court’s current caseload for the coming year. (By contrast, the last time I wrote this “Looking Ahead”
feature, the Court was setting up to hear District of Columbia v. Heller,
Boumediene v. Bush, and Medellin v. Texas, among many others).1
Nor are things likely to improve. The chief reason for the Court’s
stinginess in granting certiorari would appear to be the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, suggesting that things won’t change until a successor is installed. If, as seems likely, the slot won’t be filled until after
a new president takes office in January 2017, that means that the soonest a new associate justice could be installed and up to speed would
probably be sometime in March—and it’s quite possible that it could
be much later. So October Term 2016 seems likely to live up to the “few
and boring” description unless something surprising takes place.
One might expect an author in my position, then, to simply fold
his tents and steal away. But if legal scholars were so easily discouraged, half the law reviews in America would collapse. So after offering some highlights from among the paucity of cases that the
Supreme Court has agreed to hear, I will spend a bit of time talking
about cases they aren’t hearing, and about what the Supreme Court’s
increasingly light caseload—even in years when Justice Scalia was
*Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee
College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School, B.A. University of Tennessee. Thanks to my
research assistant, Ron Coleman, for extremely useful work on this piece.
1 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Looking Ahead: October Term 2007, 2006–2007 Cato Sup.
Ct. Rev. 335 (2007).
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alive—means for the institution, and for the American system of law.
But first, the cases.

Intellectual Disability and Execution
In Moore v. Texas,2 the Supreme Court is faced with the question
of whether the Eighth Amendment and prior decisions in Hall v.
Florida3 and Atkins v. Virginia4 require that current tests and diagnostic standards for intellectual disability be used in determining
whether an individual may be executed. (An additional question
presented—on whether an extensive, more-than-three-decade delay
in execution after the imposition of the death sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment was
initially also granted—but then the Court realized that this would
make things too interesting, so removed it.)
Bobby James Moore and two accomplices attempted to rob a grocery store in April of 1980. The robbery went badly, and one of the
store’s employees was shot and killed. Moore, as the shooter, was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.5
After habeas proceedings in state and federal courts, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit eventually found that Moore
had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the trial
and punishment phase, and that his attorney’s failure to develop or
present mitigating or exculpatory evidence was constitutionally deficient and prejudiced the outcome of the punishment phase.6
In a new state-court sentencing hearing in February 2001, Moore
was again sentenced to death. After a complex series of additional
motions and appeals, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wound
up disagreeing with a lower court regarding which standard should
be applied. The lower court applied definitions, guidelines, and
standards from the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of Mental Disorders versions IV
2
3
4

No. 15-797, opinion below at 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
536 U.S. 304 (2002).

5 Moore v. State, 700 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986).
6

Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1999).
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and V, and the legal standards outlined in Atkins. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals said this was error, and that the appropriate standard was the legal definition of intellectual disability, and standards
for proving same, set forth in Ex Parte Brizeno.7 Applying the Brizeno
standards, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the record
did not support a finding of intellectual disability.
This case boils down to the question of whether medical definitions
govern judicial assessments, or whether courts are free to develop
legal standards of their own. Unsurprisingly, Moore argues that “current medical definitions” must be used, while Texas’s argument is that
the Supreme Court has never held that states must use clinical definitions of intellectual disability, much less those promulgated by particular professional organizations. The Court’s earlier pronouncements
in Hall and Atkins invoked such standards but did not mandate them.
Instead, Texas argues that the Court in Atkins expressly left the development of standards to the states, while Hall specifically addressed
strict IQ cutoffs and did not hold that the legal definition of intellectual
disability must be strictly tied to professional clinical definitions.
The conclusion in this case is likely to turn on whether the guidelines and definitions developed by professional societies for use in a
clinical, treatment-oriented setting are appropriate for use in a legal
setting where the questions do not involve treatment, but rather capacity and culpability—a subject on which the DSM offers its own
warning.8 On the one hand, the prestige and research that stand behind the professional guidelines are likely to appeal to many on the
Court, which has traditionally deferred to medical expertise. On the
other hand, these guidelines change frequently—the DSM, for example, has gone through multiple significant revisions since the 1980
murder—and adopting them might raise questions about which set
of guidelines applies when. It also raises some questions about the
7

135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 25 (5th ed. 2013) (“Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and text are primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting clinical assessment, case formulation, and treatment planning, DSM-5 is also used as a reference for the courts and
attorneys in assessing the forensic consequences of mental disorders. As a result, it is
important to note that the definition of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health professionals, and research investigators rather than all of the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.”).
8

315

101284_12_Reynolds_R2.indd 315

8/26/16 10:33 PM

Cato Supreme Court Review
independence of courts vis-à-vis the medical establishment. Should
the justices conclude that each new edition of the DSM might set off
a flood of fresh habeas petitions, Texas is likely to win.
As a side note, though the question regarding delay in execution
was dismissed, on reading through the procedural history of the
case, the long-running nature of the proceedings is truly striking.
I was a teenager when Mr. Moore committed his crime; I’m now a
senior professor whose 401k balance seems disturbingly important.
Hearing this question would have been difficult for the Court, given
that Moore’s own ceaseless legal efforts no doubt account for much
of the delay and the State of Texas would surely have been happy to
execute him sooner.9 But I defy anyone to read this procedural history and come to the conclusion that our legal system is dealing with
capital cases well.

The Fourth Amendment, Malicious Prosecution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois deals with the scope of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and “whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process so as
to allow a malicious prosecution claim based on the Fourth Amendment.”10 This is a question that the Supreme Court raised, but did
not answer, in Albright v. Oliver.11 Since then, the circuits have split
on the question.
Elijah Manuel was arrested for possession with intent to distribute
ecstasy. A bottle of pills found in his possession when he was arrested was tested by the police who falsified the results to show that
9 These factors probably account for the Court’s dismissal of the question presented
regarding delay of execution, despite Justice Stephen Breyer’s having expressed strong
interest in that subject over the years. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1421 (1995) (joining
Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Foster v. Florida 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that “the combination of uncertainty
of execution and long delay is arguably ‘cruel’”). In addition, just a week before the
Court granted certiorari in Moore, Breyer dissented from denial of certiorari in Tucker
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 1801 (2016) (denying cert.), stressing the possibility that since
fewer than two percent of U.S. counties accounted for all death sentences nationwide,
the death penalty might itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
10
11

No. 14-9496, opinion below at 590 Fed. App’x 641 (7th Cir. 2015).

510 U.S. 266 (1994).
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the pills contained ecstasy. Lab reports confirmed that the pills were
not ecstasy on April 1, 2011, but Manuel was arraigned on April 8,
and the government did not dismiss the charges until May 4, with
Manuel being incarcerated the entire time.
Manuel sued the city on April 10, 2013, just after the two-year statute of limitations for many of his claims. But the statute on malicious prosecution had not run because his imprisonment extended
until May 4, so that claim was not time-barred. His claim was dismissed by the district court under Newsome v. McCabe,12 however, on
grounds that Illinois law provided an adequate remedy.13 On appeal,
Manuel challenged the dismissal of his malicious prosecution claim
on the grounds that it did not fall under Newsome, arguing that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had left open the possibility of a Fourth Amendment claim against officers who misrepresent evidence to prosecutors.
The Seventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, dismissed his
claim, both on the grounds that the claim arose, if at all, when he was
arrested and would thus be time-barred along with his other claims,
and because the Seventh Circuit does not recognize a federal claim
for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.
Given that 10 other circuits have accepted such a claim,14 it seems
likely that the Court granted certiorari in order to bring the Seventh
Circuit in line with the others. That’s certainly the way to bet, though
bets on Supreme Court outcomes are notoriously shaky. I might also
note that given the glacial pace of the criminal law in general, a twoyear statute of limitations on such claims seems rather brief.

Mens Rea and Bank Fraud

United States v. Shaw involves the federal bank-fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1344(1).15 The question is whether a conviction for a “scheme
to defraud a financial institution” requires proof of a specific intent
12

256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001).

13 See Manuel v. City of Joliet, No. 13 C 3022, 2014 WL 551626, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2014).

14 See Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases);
 ernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 98–99 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is now broad
H
consensus among the circuits that the Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizure
but upon probable cause extends through the pretrial period.”).
15

No. 15-5991, opinion below at 781 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2015).
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not only to deceive, but also to cheat, a bank. Defendant Lawrence
Shaw devised a scheme to extract money from the Bank of America
savings account of Stanley Hsu, obtaining the account information,
creating a PayPal account, and ultimately withdrawing $300,000 out
of the savings account and depositing it into two accounts he had
created at another bank, Washington Mutual. At trial, Shaw argued
that § 1344(1) requires the government to establish that he not only
meant to deceive the bank, but also that he intended to cheat or harm
the bank. (Victim Hsu was known to Shaw and was selected because
he didn’t review his statements regularly as would be required for
Bank of America to be liable, ensuring that PayPal, a non-bank entity, would bear the loss. Shaw argued that he had no intent to cheat
Bank of America—and in fact the government never argued at trial
that he did.) Shaw requested a jury instruction to this effect, which
was denied, and he was subsequently found guilty of 17 counts of
bank fraud.
Shaw appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which affirmed the conviction, holding that there is no need to show
intent to harm the bank. Shaw’s petition to the Supreme Court argues that there is a circuit split on this issue, with nine circuits agreeing on the need to prove intent to cheat the bank, while the Ninth
Circuit is one of three that hold no such requirement.
This case is interesting mostly because of the increased interest
in mens rea generally. Though defendant Shaw does not seem like
an ideal poster candidate for the “honest mistake” that winds up
being prosecuted as a crime,16 there is a growing interest among
reformers in limiting the reach of criminal statutes and regulations
by requiring a degree of scienter on the part of the accused.17 The
Supreme Court’s treatment of this case may offer something of a
clue as to whether those reformers have reached the ears of the
justices.

16 See Jacob Sullum, Clinton May Get a Pass on Her Intentions, So Why Do the
Democrats Want to Imprison Those Who Make Honest Mistakes, Reason.com,
July 6, 2016, http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/06/no-more-accidental-criminals.
17 See John Villasenor, Over-Criminalization and Mens Rea Reform: A Primer,
Brookings FixGov blog, Dec. 22, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
fixgov/posts/2015/12/22-mens-rea-reform-villasenor (Describing issue and reform efforts).
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Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel
In Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, the question is whether the
government can retry individuals who have had their convictions
vacated due to constitutional violations or whether such retrials are
barred by the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.18
At trial in 2011, petitioners were acquitted of conspiracy and traveling to commit bribery, but were convicted of committing bribery
under 18 U.S.C. § 666. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
then vacated the bribery conviction. The government then sought
to retry them on that charge, leading the petitioners to move to bar
retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. This motion was denied
by the district court.
The First Circuit affirmed, following the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Powell,19 which provided that when the
same jury reaches inconsistent results, “principles of collateral
estoppel—which are predicated on the assumption that the jury
acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict—are
no longer useful.”20 Given that the jury here had convicted the petitioners under Section 666 but acquitted them of any underlying
conspiracy and travel, the First Circuit held that the jury reached
inconsistent results and the Double Jeopardy Clause would not bar
a retrial.
Petitioners, however, invoke Yeager v. United States,21 which they
argue bars re-prosecution. That case dealt with hung counts that
were inconsistent with an acquittal; petitioners argue that it is
thus more favorable to them in their case, which involves a vacated unconstitutional conviction. Further, they cite North Carolina
v. Pearce for the proposition that when a conviction is vacated for
constitutional violations it has “been wholly nullified and the slate
wiped clean.”22 This seems to me to be a rather expansive reading of Pearce; whether the Court agrees will likely determine the
outcome.

18
19
20
21
22

No. 15-537, opinion below at 790 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2015).
469 U.S. 57 (1984).
Id. at 68.

557 U.S. 110 (2009).

395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969).
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Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and the Exclusion of
Churches from Government Programs
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley deals with the denial
of a state grant on the basis that the grant applicant is a church.23 The
question presented is: “Whether the exclusion of churches from an
otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the Free Exercise
and Equal Protection Clauses when the state has no valid Establishment Clause concern.”
Trinity Lutheran operates a licensed daycare center and preschool
called the Learning Center on its premises. The center is a ministry
of Trinity Church that presents daily religious teachings as part of
its program. In 2012, Trinity applied for a state grant to resurface
the playground of the Learning Center. The application was denied
based on Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, which
states that “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,
directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of
religion.”
Trinity Lutheran sued in federal district court, where it lost, and
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where
it lost again. Both courts held that Missouri was free under the U.S.
Constitution to impose a stricter separation of church and state than
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires. Petitioners argue that by excluding all religious organizations from this government program, Missouri is discriminating on the basis of religious
status in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. This is not a neutral
law of general application, they argue, because it is targeted solely
at religious organizations. They also argue that Missouri’s exclusion
“violates the Equal Protection Clause because it employs a suspect
classification that cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.”24 And, citing Plyler
v. Doe,25 they argue that religious classifications are “presumptively
invidious,” requiring a strict scrutiny that Missouri cannot satisfy
because the state has no compelling interest in excluding religious
organizations from grants of this type, and because this exclusion is
not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state’s goal.
23

No. 15-577, opinion below at 788 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2015).

Pet. Brief on Merits at 22, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Pauley,
No. 15-577, 2016 WL 1496879 at 22 (Apr. 14, 2016).
24

25

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
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In response, Missouri argues that its restriction does not prohibit
the free exercise of religion, nor does the Free Exercise Clause require states to subsidize religious institutions. The state analogizes
this to Locke v. Davey, in which state scholarships were not available
for students who pursued degrees in devotional theology, something
the Supreme Court held permissible as part of the play in the joints
between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses.26
This case may be somewhat more problematic because of the history
behind the constitutional provision in question. Missouri’s provision is
one of several state “Baby Blaine” amendments that were adopted in
the late-19th Century with the explicit intention of targeting religious
schools, in particular Catholic schools.27 The Supreme Court was able
to duck this issue in Locke v. Davey, but it is presented more squarely
here. Anti-gay animus was enough to invalidate a state law limiting
municipalities’ power to promote gay rights in Romer v. Evans;28 will
the anti-Catholic animus that inspired this Missouri provision be
enough to invalidate it now? Or will the very fact that it is Lutherans,
not Catholics, who are feeling the pinch undermine that argument?

The Cases Not Heard
If the cases heard are few and boring, the cases that the Supreme
Court has decided not to hear are worth at least a mention.

Gun Control

Shew v. Malloy deals with gun control legislation passed by the New
York and Connecticut state legislatures.29 The questions presented were:

1.

26

Whether a flat ban on possession of a class of constitutionally
protected firearms that includes the most p
 opular rifles in
the Nation should be subject merely to intermediate scrutiny,
as the Second Circuit concluded below, rather than being
deemed flatly unconstitutional under this Court’s decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), or subject
to strict scrutiny, as the Fourth Circuit has recently held.

540 U.S. 712 (2004).

See Noah Feldman, The Case Against Separating Church and State, Bloomberg
View, Jan. 19, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-01-19/the-caseagainst-separating-church-and-state.
27

28
29

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015), cert denied, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3959 (2016).
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2.

Whether Connecticut’s flat ban on a class of constitutionally
protected firearms that includes the most popular rifles in
the Nation is an unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental right to keep and bear arms.

A variety of plaintiffs challenged restrictive bans passed after the
Sandy Hook Elementary school shooting, only to have those upheld
by lower courts applying intermediate scrutiny. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in all important particulars,
and petitioners argue that the decision is inconsistent with Heller,
which should require strict scrutiny.
The Court’s decision to punt on this case, despite a split in the circuits, means that resolution of such issues will be left to future cases
in front of a future Court. Perhaps this is simply the result of a desire
to let the issue percolate in the circuits for a bit longer, but this seems
like a case where the presence of Justice Scalia might have made the
difference.

The EPA and the Rule of Law

Michigan v. EPA dealt with the lower courts’ alleged lack of response to the Supreme Court’s previous remand in this case.30 The
question presented was “When an agency promulgates a rule without any statutory authority, may a reviewing court leave the unlawful rule in place?”
Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency must
regulate emissions of hazardous pollutants from certain sources, but only
if the EPA concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary” after
studying hazards to public health posed by those sources.31 The EPA
completed the required study in 1998, and in 2000 issued a finding that
regulation of coal and oil-fired power plants was “appropriate and necessary.”32 In 2012, the EPA reaffirmed the finding and imposed emission
standards without considering the costs involved. When the case reached
the Supreme Court in 2015, the Court held that the EPA interpreted the
statute unreasonably when it chose to ignore costs, and reversed and
30 White Stallion Energy Ctr. LLC v. EPA, No. 12-1100 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2015) (order
to remand without vacatur) appeal sub nom. Michigan et. al v. EPA, cert. denied, 2016
U.S. LEXIS 3828 (2016) (No. 15-1152).
31
32

42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).

65 Fed. Reg. 79826, 79830 (2000).
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remanded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.33 Upon remand, the D.C. Circuit
allowed the regulation to remain in force while the EPA reworked it.
Petitioners argued that allowing a regulation based on an unreasonable interpretation of a statute to stand is itself unreasonable.
My own belief—and this is probably why I will never serve on the
Court—is that such an action raises obvious nondelegation problems. Perhaps that is why the Court chose not to hear it.

First Amendment
Blogging at Concurring Opinions, Ronald K. L. Collins could
be talking about the Court’s certiorari decisions in general when
he writes, “The big First Amendment news of the 2015 Term was
the cases the Court declined to hear.”34 Among the big-but-declined
cases he mentions is Electronic Arts v. Davis,35 where the question
presented was “Whether the First Amendment protects a speaker
against a state-law right-of-publicity claim that challenges the realistic portrayal of a person in an expressive work.” Davis drew considerable interest from law professors and the games industry, but
to no avail.
Also denied was a petition in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,36
where the question was “Whether and to what extent public schools,
consistent with the First Amendment, may discipline students for
their off-campus speech.”
Another denial involved a case that seems quite relevant in light
of current events, Town of Mocksville v. Hunter.37 The questions presented were “(1) Whether the First Amendment protects police officers who report misconduct in their ranks to a law enforcement
agency for investigation; and (2) whether petitioners are entitled to
qualified immunity.”
33

See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).

Ronald K. L. Collins, FAN 114 (First Amendment News) 2015 Term: What
Happened to the Big Cases?—Equally Divided or Cert. Denied, Concurring Opinions, June 29, 2016, http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2016/06/fan-114-firstamendment-news-2015-term-what-happened-to-the-big-cases-equally-divided-orcert-denied.html.
34

35
36
37

No. 15-424, opinion below at 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015).
No. 15-666, opinion below at 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015).
No. 15-480, opinion below at 789 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2015).
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And, in Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris,38 the Supreme Court
denied certiorari on the questions of “(1) Whether a state official’s
demand for all significant donors to a nonprofit organization, as a
precondition to engaging in constitutionally-protected speech, constitutes a First Amendment injury; and (2) whether the ‘exacting
scrutiny’ standard applied in compelled disclosure cases permits
state officials to demand donor information based upon generalized
‘law enforcement’ interests, without making any specific showing of
need.”
While it is always a mistake to make too much of denials of certiorari, these cases illustrate that if the 2016 caseload is short and boring, it will not be because there were no interesting cases to take.
Although one can never say in any particular case, overall it seems
highly likely that the absence of Justice Scalia, together with the unsettled political situation elsewhere, is a major factor in the Court’s
light caseload.

The Notorious RBG
Aside from cases on which certiorari has been granted or denied,
one potential issue for the coming term involves Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s comments about the apparently horrifying prospect of
a Donald Trump presidency, made in not one, but two separate interviews. Ginsburg essentially said that she found the prospect of
a Trump presidency unthinkable and joked about moving to New
Zealand. As the Washington Post noted, this has led many experts to
draw parallels to an earlier case, when Second Circuit Judge Guido
Calabresi compared President George W. Bush’s election to the elevation of Mussolini.39 Calabresi was formally admonished for that, and
while Supreme Court justices are not subject to such admonishment,
38

No. 15-152, opinion below at 784 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2015).

Aaron Blake, In Bashing Donald Trump, Some Say Ruth Bader Ginsburg Just
Crossed a Very Important Line, Wash. Post, July 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/11/in-bashing-donald-trump-some-say-ruth-baderginsburg-just-crossed-a-very-important-line. See also Daniel Drezner, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg Has Crossed Way, Way over the Line, Wash. Post, July 12, 2016, https://www
.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/07/12/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburghas-crossed-way-way-over-the-line/. Excerpt:
39

But because Ginsburg believes in speaking plainly, then let us return the
favor: This was a remarkably stupid and egregious comment for a sitting
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experts cited by the Post said that she would certainly have to recuse
herself in any litigation over Trump’s election.40
The comments were injudicious, and though they are unlikely to
become relevant in the coming term, should they in fact matter—
because of a contested election, with the nation closely divided—her
recusal, or worse, her refusal to recuse, would undoubtedly have
explosive results, both for the nation and for the Court itself, an institution that depends on public regard and that has already been
growing less popular in recent years.41 Her comments are an iceberg
Supreme Court justice to make on the record. Say what you will about Justices Antonin Scalia, who died in February, or Clarence Thomas, but they
never weighed in on presidential politics quite like this. The closest example
I can find is that in January 2004, during an election year, Scalia went on a
hunting trip with Vice President Dick Cheney. That action alone got legal
ethicists into a lather.
What Ginsburg did was way worse, though. Indeed, I can find no modern
instance of a Supreme Court justice being so explicit about an election—and
for good reason. . . . As I noted earlier this year, trust in the Supreme Court
was bound to take a hit after the death of Scalia and the partisan deadlock
over filling his seat. But if eroding trust was a slow-burning political fire,
Ginsburg just poured gasoline on it. There are certain privileges that one
sacrifices to be a sitting member of the federal judiciary and making explicitly partisan comments about presidential elections is one of those privileges.

Drezner cites other pundits and legal experts, none of them Trump supporters, who
agree. See Mark Joseph Stern, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Just Risked Her Judicial Independence, Her Ethical Standing, And Her Legacy To Insult Trump, Slate, July 12, 2016, http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/07/ruth_bader_
ginsburg_risks_her_legacy_to_insult_donald_trump.html (“To be clear, what Ginsburg is
doing right now—pushing her case against Trump through on-the-record interviews—is
not just unethical; it’s dangerous. As a general rule, justices should refrain from commenting on politics, period. That dictate applies to 83-year-old internet folk heroes as strictly as
it applies to anybody else who dons judicial robes. The independence of our judiciary—
and just as critically, its appearance of impartiality—hinges on a consistent separation
between itself and the other branches of government. That means no proclamations of
loyalty to any candidate, or admissions of distaste of any other.”) Ginsburg subsequently
apologized, but the damage was done. David Savage, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Apologizes for ‘Ill-Advised’ Criticism of Donald Trump, L.A. Times, July 14, 2016, http://
www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ginsburg-trump-apology-20160714-snap-story.html.
40 But hey, how likely is it that a presidential election will wind up in front of the
Supreme Court? I mean, when has that ever happened?

41 See, e.g., Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, Confidence in Institutions, http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/
confidence-in-institutions-trends-in-americans-attitudes-toward-government-mediaand-business0310-2333.aspx.
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that most likely will never meet its Titanic, but are worth noting here
because, should that meeting come to pass, the results would surely
be the most significant event of the coming term.

Is There a United States Supreme Court?
Some time ago, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, I noted that perhaps
the Supreme Court isn’t as important as we might think:
The Supreme Court’s caseload continues to fall, with the
Court producing 76 signed opinions last year, down from
129 thirty years before. And this drop has occurred despite
a dramatic growth in the number of opinions issued by
lower federal courts and state supreme courts. In the twelve
months ending September 30, 2002, the regional Courts of
Appeals decided 27,758 cases on the merits, compared to
a mere 777 for the year ending March 31, 1973. The result
is that, as a percentage of the whole, virtually no lowercourt opinions are reviewed by the Supreme Court. A given
opinion in a trial court, in fact, is probably less likely to see
Supreme Court review than the trial judge issuing it is to be
struck by lightning.42

We can’t know with certainty how many decisions the Supreme
Court will render in the coming term, but it appears likely that the
trend described above will continue, and there is no chance whatsoever of the Court’s reviewing anything like the percentage of
cases that it reviewed in 1973. That raises the question: Do we have a
United States Supreme Court?
In popular imagining, and for that matter in general legal thought,
the Supreme Court sits at the top of a judicial pyramid, where decisions of federal courts and decisions of state courts applying federal law (including the U.S. Constitution) come for final resolution.
It’s true, of course, that the Supreme Court is, as its discretionary
jurisdiction implies, an institution that provides general supervision, not one that guarantees correction of errors in individual cases.
42 Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Marbury’s Mixed Messages, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 303, 305–06
(2004). I also raised this issue in my 2007 “Looking Ahead” piece for this journal. But
Mike Graetz once told me that you have to say something in print three times before
anyone pays attention. This is number three!
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Nonetheless, even that less-demanding task would seem to be beyond the capacity of an entity that produces so little output in relation to its input.
In addition, there is considerable reason to believe that lower
courts are less than faithful in following the Supreme Court’s guidance when it points them in a direction that they, for various reasons,
don’t want to go. That, at least, is what Brannon Denning and I have
found in a multiyear survey of lower-court opinions responding
to the Supreme Court’s pro-federalism holdings in United States v.
Lopez and United States v. Morrison.43 Our research, in fact, suggests
that lower courts are acting like the imaginary judge described by
Judge Gilbert S. Merritt in a prophetic Yale Law Journal article written over three decades ago:
I am a manager of events, appointed to get a job done, and . . .
what is important is not so much the process and the creative
act but the result, the practical consequences, the effect on
society. Like senators, university administrators, newspaper
publishers, and major executives, I must concentrate on the
big picture and delegate responsibility to others to carry
out my orders. Nobody reads district court opinions these
days except the parties. Gone are the days of the poets and
philosophers of the law like Marshall, Shaw, Holmes, Hand,
Cardozo, and Traynor.44

In short, all too often a sort of desk-clearing mentality is in the driver’s
seat. The following is a short description of what we found, followed
by some further thoughts on what this means for the importance (or
lack thereof) of the Supreme Court.
In our research, we thought that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lopez offered an interesting opportunity to watch a major doctrinal
shift percolate through the lower courts. Prior to Lopez, the conventional wisdom was that Congress could do essentially anything it
wanted under the Commerce Clause, something that, as Deborah
Merritt noted, had become a law-school joke by the 1980s.45 Indeed,
43 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
44 Gilbert S. Merritt, Owen Fiss on Paradise Lost: The Judicial Bureaucracy in the
Administrative State, 92 Yale L.J. 1469, 1471 (1983).
45

Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 691 (1995).
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as Lynn Baker and Ernest Young have pointed out, federalism had
by that time become part of a “Constitution in exile.”46 Observing the
lower courts’ response to this change seemed likely to provide some
insight into how lower courts respond to Supreme Court doctrine
generally.
And it did, though at first things were a bit unclear. The initial
installment of our project, published in the Wisconsin Law Review in
2000, was subtitled “What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?”47 There, we concluded that
lower courts seemed strangely slow to respond to the Lopez decision,
but suggested that Supreme Court clarification might improve matters. We wrote:
[Decisions based on Lopez] provide a background for two
very different, though not necessarily entirely inconsistent,
stories. One story—not very flattering to court of appeals
judges—is that of an ossified intermediate bench in the
throes of “judicial sclerosis,” unable or unwilling to apply
Supreme Court decisions that depart too sharply from
business as usual. This story seems particularly compelling
in the context of the drug and firearms cases, where the
courts’ impatience with constitutional arguments that might
keep unpopular offenders out of jail is palpable, and where
Lopez issues are dismissed in terse paragraphs containing
little or no analysis.
But there is another story, too; this one is not very flattering
to the Supreme Court. The view of appellate judging
provided in most law school classes is a fairly simple one:
Higher courts select principles, which lower courts then
apply faithfully. As any lawyer with even a modicum of
practice experience can attest, the situation in the real world
is more complex. For example, that the lower courts are
supposed to apply principles articulated by higher courts
presumes that the principles of the upper courts are easily
identifiable and readily available for application by the

46 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 75 (2001).

47 Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?,
2000 Wis. L. Rev. 369.
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lower courts. But as the multiplicity of readings to which
Lopez has been subject suggests, higher courts (in this case,
the United States Supreme Court) do not always fulfill this
responsibility. . . .
In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck a bold and telling blow
for limited government and a return to the first principles of
the Constitution. Or it didn’t. Or maybe it did, but it just did
not say it very well. After all, it does not matter how loudly
you speak if you mumble when you do so.
How will we know which? The cynical—and, perhaps sadly,
correct—answer in this case is, we will know when the
Supreme Court tells us. Given the Court’s decision this Term
to resolve the split in the circuits over the Violence Against
Women Act occasioned by the Brzonkala decision, as well
as the scope of the federal arson statute, perhaps Supreme
Court resolution is not too far away.48

Though the Supreme Court was almost certainly unmoved by
our pleas, it did grant certiorari in those very cases, and in both it
seemed to underscore the importance of the Lopez decision in terms
that seemed to remove most excuses for lower-court foot-dragging.
A couple of years later, we authored the next installment of our
survey.49 Unfortunately, we found that lower courts were, in fact,
doing little to put Lopez’s reasoning into effect. Examining the large
number of lower-court cases addressing Commerce Clause issues,
we found ample evidence of a desk-clearing mentality at work. We
concluded:
But if ideology is not the source of lower court resistance—
or, if any sustained inquiry is likely to result in the old Scots
verdict, “not proven”—is there an explanation for lower
courts’ behavior? Research by other scholars suggests that the
problem here, to paraphrase former presidential candidate
Michael Dukakis, is not ideology, but rather competence.
What we are seeing in lower courts’ Commerce Clause

48

Id. at 397, 399–400 (citations omitted).

Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1253
(2003).
49
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decisions may be only symptomatic of a larger problem in the
federal judiciary: that of courts responding to an increasingly
unmanageable caseload by resorting to corner-cutting,
resulting in an overall reduction in the quality of courts’
work product. . . .
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the land. Lower
courts follow its precedents. The makeup of the Supreme
Court is thus the most important influence on American
constitutional law. These are statements so taken for granted
that they are seldom even examined. But in fact, reality seems
to be more complex than that.
That complexity holds a number of lessons. One is that
the way we teach constitutional law is simplistic: the way
that Supreme Court opinions affect the system is far more
complex and indeterminate than the casebooks suggest. That
complexity exists in a variety of forms, but the way in which
Supreme Court precedents do (or do not) percolate down
through the lower courts is surely more important than the
standard tale would make it seem. Another is that the lower
courts simply are not living up to the general expectations
we have had for them, in terms of thoughtfulness, fairness,
and a willingness to give a hearing to litigants regardless of
their stature or of the crimes of which they are accused. This
failure is a serious one, not only for justice but for the very
legitimacy of the system.50

Indeed, in examining the Supreme Court’s behavior, one might
almost compare its role to that of the Turkish or Argentinean armies
over much of the 20th century—as an independent check on the
political system that overturns things whenever the politicians seem
to have gone too far, without a whole lot of positive law basis for deciding when that is.51
Whether such a role for the Court is constructive or unhealthy is
a matter of opinion. I have written in the past that even an inconsistent or unpredictable Supreme Court—a chaotic one, in fact—might
nonetheless play a positive role by breaking up special-interest

50

Id. at 1303, 1310 (citations omitted).

See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Of Coups and the Constitution, unpublished work in
progress, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802308.
51
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dominance that is unreachable by ordinary political means.52 I
confess that I find myself turning to that analysis for comfort these
days, when the Court, like the Turkish Army, appears past its prime
in its constitution-preserving role.
It remains unclear what is to be done about this problem. The
Supreme Court could, and probably should, hear more cases, but
the gap between the activity of lower courts and the Supreme
Court’s capacity to decide cases is still enormous. American society
could return to 1973 levels of litigiousness, but that seems highly
unlikely. We could, as some have proposed, interpose a National
Court of Appeals between the circuits and the Supreme Court, but
that solution in a sense only compounds the problem by giving the
Supreme Court more lower courts to supervise. And we should certainly pay closer attention to the work of the courts of appeals, since
they are, for all practical purposes, courts of last resort for almost
every litigant.
A solution to this problem, at any rate, is beyond the scope of this
short article. But despite the fascination with what the Court did last
year, and will do next year, it is worth keeping in mind that in a very
real sense, we don’t have a Supreme Court at all. This may be an
undiplomatic point to make in a journal that is, after all, dedicated
to the Supreme Court’s doings, but that doesn’t make it any less true.

52

Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110 (1991).
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